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I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's landmark case, Obergefell v. Hodges, provided
unprecedented legal recognition for homosexual couples across the United
States by extending the "fundamental right to marry" to same-sex couples.
The marriage equality decision divided more than just the Justices.2
Obergefell spurred a national debate over the expanding nature of lesbian,
gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) rights.3 News of the controversial
ruling quickly took social media by storm. Millions of Twitter users,
including the former U.S. President Barack Obama, expressed support for the
Obergefell decision using the viral hashtag #LoveWins.4
The legal recognition of same-sex couples' right to marry left both sides
of the debate wondering what the future would hold for LGBT rights. This
Note proposes that the familiar childhood song, "first comes love, then
comes marriage, then comes baby in the baby carriage," offers useful insight.
As Obergefell ushers in a new era of marriage equality, it will be imperative
to determine what form the "baby-carriage" will take for same-sex couples in
the United States.s
Using the United Kingdom as a model, this Note speculates that the
Obergefell decision will initiate an expansion of homosexual couples' access
to infertility treatments and to the growing area of assisted reproductive
technology (ART) in the United States. In the U.K., legal recognition and
1 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
2 See id. at 2611-26 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (arguing the majority ignored the
constitutional, historical, and precedent-based limitations on judicial review in favor of
philosophical and fairness-based reasoning); id. at 2629 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (suggesting
that the unelected Supreme Court bypassed the democratic process and used the Obergefell
decision to engage in "super-legislative" law-making, invading a role constitutionally reserved
for the legislature); id. at 2631-40 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (objecting to the majority's
definition of liberty that includes entitlement to particular governmental benefits, which he
argues is at odds with the historical intent of the framers of the Constitution); id. at 2640-43
(Alito, J., dissenting) (finding that the majority's opinion undermined an essential principal of
federalism, by removing the possibility of state experimentation); see also Adam Liptak, Gay
Marriage Arguments Divide Supreme Court Justices, N.Y. TIMIEs (Apr. 28, 2015), http://
www.nytimes.com/2015/04/29/us/supreme-court-same-sex-marriage.html?_r=0.
See Daniel Burke, The Next Battle over Gay Rights, CNN (June 29, 2015), http://www.
cnn.com/2015/06/26/living/next-battle-same-sex/.
4 Approximately 6.2 million tweets used the hashtag #LoveWins to discuss the marriage
equality decision. Kerry Flynn, How #LoveWins on Twitter Became the Most Viral Hashtag
of the Same-Sex Marriage Ruling, INT'L Bus. TIMES (June 26, 2015), http://www.ibtimes.
com/how-lovewins-twitter-became-most-viral-hashtag-same-sex-marriage-ruling-1986279.
5 Daniel Sperling argues that the right to parent is "one of the primeval and most
elementary interests a person may have" regardless of sexual orientation. See Daniel Sperling,
'Male and Female He Created Them': Procreative Liberty, its Conceptual Deficiencies and
the Legal Right to Access Fertility Care ofMales, 7 INT'L J. L. CONTEXT 375, 375-77 (2011).
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popular support for LGBT rights preceded any significant expansion of
fertility treatment and ART services to same-sex couples. U.S. healthcare
policy reform has historically followed a similarly responsive position to
both legal and social changes. Therefore, it may reasonably be predicted that
the Obergefell decision will have far-reaching legal and social implications
that go beyond constitutional rights into the healthcare industry.
This Note begins its discussion by providing a brief overview of the
history and development of ART around the world. This Note then looks to
the United Kingdom for an example of expanding ART services to
homosexual couples before assessing the present state of the law in the
United States. The U.S. analysis is introduced by a close reading of the
Obergefell decision, highlighting the narrowness of the Court's holding
while also exploring the opinion's breadth. This Note then analyzes the
position of fourteen existing state statutes that mandate coverage of infertility
diagnosis and treatment. Using a variety of statutory interpretation tools, this
Note contemplates how Obergefell's national recognition of same-sex
marriage may change the interpretation and application of these preexisting
state statutes.
It is the position of this Note that Obergefell renders preexisting state
statutes that require insurers to cover infertility treatments and ART
convoluted and unworkable. Ambiguous and discriminatory statutory
language must be redrafted to account for Obergefell and shifting cultural
norms. Therefore, this Note anticipates that the United States will expand
insurance coverage for infertility treatments and ART to include same-sex
couples affected by infertility by tailoring existing state insurance mandates.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Infertility Treatments and ART
Infertility is a pervasive medical and social issue that increasingly affects
women and men in every country around the world. Recognizing this, both
the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Centers for Disease Control
identified infertility as a public health issue.7 Further, the WHO and the
6 Following the Civil Partnership Act of 2004 and the Marriage (Same-Sex Couples) Act
of 2013, the U.K. National Health Service extended same-sex couples equal rights to IVF as
heterosexual couples. See Fertility Treatment for Same Sex Couples, UKHEATHCARECENTER,
http://www.healthcentre.org.uk/fertility-treatment/fertility-same-sex-couples.html (last visited
Oct. 17, 2015); see also Joan Mahoney, Great Britain's National Health Service and Assisted
Reproduction, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 403, 409-10 (2009).
Marie-Eve Lemoine, Toward a Public Health Approach to Infertility: The Ethical
Dimensions oflnfertility Prevention, 6 PuB. HEALTH ETHICS 3, 287 (2013).
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World Bank estimate "infertility to be the 5th largest cause of disability for
people under 60."' This high profile coverage illustrates that the
international community considers infertility a universal and growing issue.
However, diagnosing infertility can be difficult. There is not always a
conclusive medical test to diagnose infertility. Thus, modem definitions of
infertility increasingly look to a practical, results-based diagnosis rather than
a traditional medical test. The WHO provides a good example, defining
infertility in terms of an individual or a couple's inability to conceive over a
specified period of time. The WHO defines the term "infertility" as "a
disease of the reproductive system defined by the failure to achieve a clinical
pregnancy after 12 months or more of regular unprotected sexual
intercourse."9 A majority of states with fertility coverage mandates rely on
similar results-based standards to determine infertility.
Though diagnosis can be difficult, there are numerous treatment options
for infertility. Those that involve external means of conception are typically
categorized as assisted reproductive technology (ART).' 0  In vitro
fertilization (IVF) is a well-known example of ART. IVF combines a
female's eggs and a male's sperm outside the female's body and then
deposits the fertilized egg in the uterus." These modern medical and
technological advances provide infertile couples with a newfound capacity to
procreate biologically. Since the first successful in vitro fertilization in 1978,
the international demand for and use of ART measures has continued to
grow rapidly. 12 For couples struggling to conceive, ART boasts impressive
Siri Tellier & Josephine Obel, Infertility, GLOBAL HEALTH MINDERS 2 (2015), http://
www.globalhealthninders.dk/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/GHM-Infertility-Brief.pdf.
9 Id. at 1.
10 Infertility treatment options that are not classified as ART include but are not limited to:
prescription medications, hormone therapy, and intrauterine insemination (a procedure
wherein a prepared male's sperm is inserted into the mother's uterus, often referred to as
artificial insemination). See Infertility FAQs, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
http://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/infertility/ (last updated Apr. 14, 2016). ART is
generally considered to include in vitro fertilization, zygote intrafallopian transfer (a
procedure similar to IVF wherein the fertilized egg is placed inside the fallopian tube), gamete
intrafallopian transfer (a procedure wherein eggs and sperm are transferred to the fallopian
tube, where the fertilization takes place), and intracytoplasmic sperm injection (a procedure
wherein a single sperm is injected into a single egg). Id.
11 Id.
12 Paul R. Brezina & Yulian Zhao, The Ethical, Legal, and Social Issues Impacted by
Modern Assisted Reproductive Technologies, 2012 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY INT'L 1, 1-7
(estimating the usage of ART in developed countries is increasing at an annual rate of 5V10--
10%); State Laws Related to Insurance Coverage for Infertility Treatment, NAT'L CONF. ST.
LEGIS. (June 1, 2014), http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/insurance-coverage-for-infertility-
laws.aspx (revealing that more than 1% of all U.S. births are conceived via ART, totaling
61,600 children born via ART in 2008 alone).
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success rates of 40% in cases where the mother is less than thirty-five years
of age.13 However, numerous restrictions still inhibit the widespread use of
ART, most notably soaring costs.
B. The Cost ofAssisted Reproduction
The financial cost of ART remains one of the most restrictive factors
preventing access to alternative reproduction measures. The average cost of
one IVF cycle in 2009, accounted for approximately 15%-18% of
individuals' annual disposable income in the U.K. and 44/- 50% in the
United States. 14 In response, many developed countries adopted varying
approaches designed to shift the financial burden away from the individual
and on to third-party insurers, national healthcare schemes, or some
combination of the two.'5
Historically, such cost-shifting programs focused on providing relief to
traditional families composed of heterosexual couples affected by medically
diagnosed infertility. As a result, many countries limited access to third-
party ART funding by imposing qualification requisites that frequently
excluded single women and same-sex couples. In light of the international
community's recent recognition of an array of LGBT legal rights, many
ideologically based restrictions, such as exclusions due to an individual's
sexual orientation, are now under fire.
C. Same-Sex Couples and ART
Numerous factors can affect an infertile couple's access to ART regardless
of the couple's sexual orientation. However, the historical discrimination of
the LGBT community marginalized homosexuality, and in consequence same-
sex couples and homosexual individuals continue to face unique obstacles in
the family planning arena.' 6 The arduous development of adoption protocols
13 CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, supra note 10.
14 Georgina M. Chambers, Elizabeth A. Sullivan, Osamu Ishihara, Michael G. Chapman &
G. David Adamson, The Economic Impact ofAssisted Reproductive Technology: A Review of
Selected Developed Countries, 91 FERTILITY & STERILITY 6, 2281, 2289 (2009).
15 For a comparative analysis of international ART financing, see id. at 2281-94.
1 For example, the American Psychiatric Association classified homosexuality as a mental
disorder until 1973, and as ego-dystonic homosexuality until 1986. Gregory M. Herek, Facts
About Homosexuality and Mental Health, U. CAL. DAVIS, http://psychology.ucdavis.edu/rain
bow/html/factsmental health.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2016). These classifications of
homosexuality as pathological contributed to widespread stigmatization and discrimination
towards homosexuals. Id. This negative stigma continued within American society long after
the removal of homosexuality from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
and still affects the lives of numerous LGBT persons today.
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for homosexuals provides an example of the LGBT community's struggle to
gain legal and social validation in this space. It was not until the 1990s that
most states began to permit homosexual persons and couples to adopt." Given
the complex history of LGBT rights, it is important to insulate this Note's
discussion of the issue of same-sex couples' access to infertility treatments and
ART from ideological debates about homosexuality.
There are two principal ways to challenge a program where access to
fertility treatment funding depends on the sexual orientation of the
applicant." One argument advocates for the establishment of a positive right
to procreate; the other challenges differences in health insurance coverage
and funding depending on an individual's sexual orientation.19
The first approach turns on the controversial recognition of a couple's
right to procreate regardless of sexual orientation. 2 0 By this argument, legal
distinctions based on sexual orientation impose disproportionate financial
burdens on same-sex couples that cannot afford unfunded ART measures.
Without funding, large numbers of same-sex couples may be excluded from
parenting a biological child, which for many may result in severe economic
and social costs. 2 1 This practice can be challenged as discriminatory because
such a program denies to certain individuals the ability to parent a biological
child on the basis of their sexual orientation.22 A challenge structured in this
way implicitly relies on the acknowledgement of a universal right to parent
biological offspring. This is problematic because no positive right to
procreate has been legally recognized, even for heterosexual couples. 23
The second approach does not necessitate the recognition of a positive
legal right to procreate, but rather examines the discriminatory effect of
24distinguishing healthcare coverage due to a patient's sexual orientation.
17 In the United States, the question of who may adopt is largely a matter of state law, and
thus the standards vary from state to state. See Overview of Lesbian and Gay Parenting,
Adoption and Foster Care, AM. Civ. LIBERTIES UNION, https://www.aclu.org/fact-sheet/overvi
ew-lesbian-and-gay-parenting-adoption-and-foster-care?redirect=overview-lesbian-and-gay-p
arenting-adoption-and-foster-care (last visited Oct. 27, 2015).
1 See Sperling, supra note 5, at 375-77.
'9 Id.
20 Expanding upon John Robertson's classic principal of procreative liberty, Sperling
argues persons of all sexual orientations may share the "primeval" desire to parent biological
children. However, Sperling also identifies numerous "conceptual difficulties" associated
with identifying a formal right to procreate. Id.
21 The economic and social costs associated with infertility and childlessness can affect
people at the "individual and societal levels." Tellier & Obel, supra note 8, at 2.
Sperling, supra note 5, at 375-77.
23 Id.
24 See id at 384-95 (noting the shortfalls of courts that merely establish a procreative
liberty right and advocating for a comprehensive legal scheme that serves to eliminate
discrimination based on moral judgments).
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Under this framework, the denial of funding arguably results in a significant
and quantifiable financial obstacle unique to homosexual couples.25 These
financial burdens disproportionately amplify what many consider to be the
"first and most far-reaching barrier" to ART.26 While it is true that, without
third-party funding, same-sex couples are not prevented from biological
procreation, the practical effect of restricting funding dramatically reduces
the participation of homosexuals in alternative reproduction methods. This
second characterization of the issue provides for a more focused and
successful analysis of the relevant issues. By narrowly tailoring the legal
analysis to concrete factual inquires such as the financial burdens resulting
from the alleged discrimination, the inquiry is strategically insulated from the
many ideological debates surrounding LGBT rights.
Further, by framing the question of access as one of potential
discrimination, the issue of homosexual access to ART funding more closely
mirrors the language of Obergefell. In that case, the majority expressed
concern over widespread practices that primarily function to "disrespect and
subordinate gays and lesbians."27 This Note uses the second framing,
identifying the issue of same-sex couples' access to infertility treatments and
ART as one of arbitrary line drawing and discrimination.
III. ANALYSIS
A. The United Kingdom
The U.K. has been a leader in the medical development of infertility
treatments and ART services ever since it welcomed the first baby born via
IVF conception, Louise Brown, in Oldham, England on July 25, 1978.28
Therefore, analyzing the U.K.'s development of increasing access to ART,
legal recognition of LGBT rights, and the intersection of the two, provides an
interesting case study. This Note positions the U.K. as a model from which a
similar expansion of access rights to ART for same-sex couples in the United
States may be predicted. The international comparison provides a useful
25 id.
26 Id. at 396.
27 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2590-91 (2015) (recognizing the intersection
of the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause, the Court acknowledged that laws
infringed on the liberty of same-sex couples and "abridged central precepts of equality,"
which was especially problematic for the Court in light of "a long history of disapproval of
[same-sex] relationships").
28 Louise Brown Biography, Blo. (Apr. 2, 2014), http://www.biography.com/people/louise-
brown-95420722.
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framework due to the numerous cultural and legal similarities between the
U.K. and the United States.
In 1982, the British Government sought to comprehensively address the
potential benefits, risks, and implications of widespread use of ART services
by establishing a multi-disciplinary committee to explore the medical and
ethical questions facing the emerging field of assisted reproductive
technologies. 2 9  This committee generated the Warnock Report, which
recommended that the National Health Service (NHS) should provide
fertility treatment including IVF. 30  The Report proposed that fertility
treatments be extended to heterosexual couples, regardless of whether the
couple was married.3 1 Following this Report, the committee's
recommendations were enacted into law in 1990 via the Human Fertilization
and Embryology Act (H!FEA), which permitted, though did not require, the
use of ARTs to treat infertility by the NHS and licensed private providers.32
The 2000s ushered in an era of prolific social change for the LGBT
movement in the U.K. and initiated a series of groundbreaking legislative
acts, beginning with the passing of the Civil Partnership Act in 2004. The
Civil Partnership Act provided same-sex couples legal recognition equivalent
to married heterosexual couples.34 The government amended the HFEA
regulations four years later to include lesbian couples and to permit a
mother's female partner to be legally recognized as the child's second
parent. 35 Ultimately, the passage of the Marriage (Same-Sex Couples) Act of
2013 granted full marriage rights to same-sex couples in England and Wales,
which then led Scotland to pass similar legislation in 2014.36
29 Mahoney, supra note 6, at 404-05.
30 Id. at 405.
3 Id. at 406.
32 Id. at 407.
33 England and Wales extended to same-sex couples the opportunity to register for a civil
partnership on religious premises in 2011. Civil Partnership Review (England and Wales): A
Consultation, 8, DEP'T FOR CULTURE MEDIA & SPORT (Jan. 2014), https://www.gov.uk/govern
ment/uploads/system/uploads/attachmentdata/file/274449/140122_CPcon docpdf docx.pdf
(revealing that over 16,000 couples registered for civil partnerships within the first year, and an
average of 6,000 same-sex couples annually entered into civil partnerships after the first year).
34 Id
35 Mahoney, supra note 6, at 409-10.
36 No such same-sex marriage right has been established in Northern Ireland. Joseph
Patrick McCormick, Thousands Call for End to Northern Irish Gay Marriage Ban at Belfast
Pride (Aug. 7, 2016, 1:10 AM), http://www.pinknews.co.uk/2016/08/07/thousands-call-for-
end-to-northern-irish-gay-marriage-ban-at-belfast-pride/ (identifying Northern Ireland as the
last place in the British Isles without marriage equality). However, Northern Ireland
authorizes non-religious civil partnerships and recognizes same-sex marriages that are legally
performed in other states.
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Presently in the U.K., the same alternative reproductive opportunities are
available to same-sex couples as to heterosexual couples. Marriage is not a
prerequisite to ART services for either heterosexual or same-sex couples.
Covered procedures include both IVF and artificial insemination. 3 7 While
NHS does not extend ART services to all, the eligibility criteria apply evenly
to homosexual and heterosexual couples. A healthcare provider may
consider the applicant's body mass index, whether the applicant already has
children, and whether previous ART attempts have been unsuccessful in
determining whether to extend ART and other infertility procedures."
Critics of the NHS's discretionary approach argue subjective standards can
result in unequal access to infertility treatments. 3 9 Nevertheless, the alleged
disparate access is not based on sexual orientation but rather on differences
in doctor discretion.
It is noteworthy that the historical development of alternative
reproductive and fertility access in the U.K. closely followed the recognition
of same-sex couples' rights to civil partnerships and marriage. This suggests
that the principles of marriage equality were linked to the subsequent
development of non-discriminatory family planning and procreative rights.
It is the position of this Note that the present state of ART access in the U.K.
is both reflective of and responsive to the expanding legal status of same-sex
couples, and it is specifically tied to the right to same-sex marriage.
B. The United States
The United States welcomed its first baby born via ART in 1981.40 Since
then, the practice has grown dramatically. The United States presently
37 England provides infertile women with up to three cycles of IVF and intra-cytoplasmic
sperm injection. Comparable regulations are in place in Scotland, Wales, and Northern
Ireland. See NHS Fertility Treatment, HuMAN FERTILIZATION & EMBRYOLOGY AUTH., http://
www.hfea.gov.uk/fertility-treatment-cost-nhs.html (last updated Jan. 6, 2015); see also
Fertility Treatment for Same Sex Couples, supra note 6.
38 NHS Fertility Treatment, supra note 37.
39 Joan Mahoney highlights the problems presented by a permissive approach to ART as
opposed to a mandatory universal coverage requirement. Mahoney laments that the structure
of the NHS-in which the national government divides the country into local Primary Trusts
that retain a large amount of discretion over the allocation and issuance of medical resources
and services-frequently results in disparate access. Mahoney, supra note 6, at 407-08. See
also Sperling, supra note 5, at 385-86 (raising concern over the delegation of ART regulation
to the HFEA whose Code of Practice requires primary care givers to consider the "welfare of
the future child" when making eligibility determinations, a system which arguably permits
"moral judgments" of the individual seeking ART to be determinative).
40 National ART Surveillance, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://
www.cdc.gov/art/nass/index.html (last updated Aug. 2, 2016).
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features approximately 440 fertility clinics that provide ART services.4 In
422008, an estimated 61,600 children were born via non-donor ART services.
Comparatively, the CDC reported 190,773 ART cycles were performed in
2013, meaning that ART accounted for approximately 1.5% of all children
born in the United States during that year.4 3
Cost and financing concerns, similar to those seen in the U.K., prohibit
the widespread use of ART in the United States." Historically, insurance
coverage for infertility was not subject to governmental regulation in the
United States. 45 However, a number of state legislatures have recognized the
obstacle of cost and have responded by mandating infertility coverage by
third-party insurers in their jurisdictions. Evidence of the legislative purpose
can be glossed from the statutory text. For example, West Virginia's Health
Maintenance Organization Act of 1977 cited "mounting costs" as a
motivating factor for the state government to intervene in the insurance
market.46 A primary goal of state legislation was to make ART more readily
available to the general population so that an infertile patient's choice to
parent a biological child would not be dependent on the financial status of
the individual or couple.4 7
1. Obergefell v. Hodges
Before analyzing the existing state insurance mandates, it is necessary to
first recognize the narrow scope of Obergefell. Understanding the decision's
limitations helps to dispel some of the common misconceptions associated
with the Supreme Court's decision. Obergefell did not establish a general
41 id
42 Lemoine, supra note 7.
43 ART Success Rates, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.
gov/art/reports/index.html (last updated Aug. 26, 2015).
4 Chambers, Sullivan, Ishihara, Chapman & Adamson, supra note 14, at 2288 (revealing
that the average cost of a single cycle of IVF in 2009 was $12,513, representing
approximately 44% of disposable income).
This structural distinction is representative of the United States' preference for principals
of federalism and adherence to a market-based healthcare system as opposed to the U.K.'s
centralized authority under a national healthcare scheme. However, the U.S. federal
government has not been entirely absent from the healthcare market; it has occupied a limited
regulatory role in the interest of public health through agencies such as the U.S. Food and
Drug Administration. See also Sperling, supra note 5, at 390.
46 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-25A-1 (LEXIS through Acts of the 2016 First Extraordinary
Session 2016).
47 The West Virginia statute further provides that it was enacted "with a view toward
achieving greater efficiency, availability, distribution and economy" by providing "basic
healthcare services" to "eliminate legal barriers to the establishment of prepaid health care
plans accountable to consumers for the health care services they provide. Id.
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cause of action for discrimination based on sexual orientation. The majority
was very careful to limit its holding to the specific issue at hand: "whether
the Constitution protects the right of same-sex couples to marry." 48 Thus, the
Obergefell precedent has the force of law only with respect to same-sex
marriage.
Despite its narrow holding, Obergefell provides strong language to
support the trend of expanding constitutional protections for discrimination
against the LGBT community. One area in which this theme is explored is in
the majority's discussion of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses:
The Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause are
connected in a profound way, though they set forth independent
principles. Rights implicit in liberty and rights secured by equal
protection may rest on different precepts and are not always co-
extensive, yet in some instances each may be instructive as to the
meaning and reach of the other. In any particular case one
Clause may be thought to capture the essence of the right in a
more accurate and comprehensive way, even as the two Clauses
may converge in the identification and definition of the
right ... This interrelation of the two principles furthers our
understanding of what freedom is and must become.49
This language implies that discriminatory treatment of same-sex couples may
be inconsistent with a larger constitutional ideal of freedom. The Obergefell
majority interestingly does not pinpoint a specific constitutional clause at
issue but instead suggests there is an amalgamated liberty right "promised by
the Fourteenth Amendment" generally.so Though this portion of the opinion
is largely undeveloped and somewhat vague, it highlights the Court's
inclination to broadly promote certain homosexual liberty interests. This
language suggests the Court supports the recent trend of striking down legal
and social practices that are discriminatory on the basis of sexual
48 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2606.
49 Id. at 2602-03.
50 Id. at 2602-05. The Obergefell majority's language mirrored that used in the 2013 case,
United States v. Windsor. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013) (providing
that "[t]he Constitution's guarantee of equality 'must at the very least mean that a bare
congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot' justify disparate treatment
of that group").
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orientation." This language could serve as ammunition for more expansive
legal recognition of LGBT rights, particularly in the reproductive sphere.
The Obergefell majority was more specific in its discussion of the value
of family. The Court repeatedly compared the fundamental right of same-
sex couples to marry to other arenas that have historically been afforded
Constitutional protection, such as parental and family rights.52 The majority
builds its argument by drawing similarities to other recent Equal Protection
and Due Process cases, which have tackled controversial topics of family
planning such as abortion and contraception. The Court poignantly
acknowledges that the decision to marry, like questions of contraception and
family relationships, is private and solely between the couple. This
recognition arguably works to insulate not only same-sex marriage.
discrimination, but also other "intimate" decisions such as the decision to
reproduce and establish a family from overzealous governmental
intervention and discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.5 3
In this same vein, the Court included powerful dicta that further
intertwined the relationship between the fundamental right to same-sex
marriage and the emerging legal rights of parents. The Court identified
children's need for protection as one of the primary arguments in support of
its national recognition of same-sex marriage. 54  It further explained this
connection by pointing out the negative effects that discriminatory marriage
policies have on children.55 The Court recognizes that the stigmatization of
gay and lesbian parents in the family context can be debilitating both legally
and socially. The limits of Obergefell's language here, however, are
important. The majority does not state that same-sex couples have any
positive right to parent children, and as discussed earlier, the legal
recognition of any such positive right to procreate is unlikely. The ideas
51 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2696 (holding the Defense of Marriage Act, DOMA, was
unconstitutional in violation of the Fifth Amendment because it served "no legitimate
[governmental] purpose").
52 "Like choices concerning contraception, family relationships, procreation, and
childrearing, all of which are protected by the Constitution, decisions concerning marriage are
among the most intimate that an individual can make." Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2589.
53 id.
54 "A third basis for protecting the right to marry is that it safeguards children and families
and thus draws meaning from related rights of childrearing, procreation, and education." Id. at
2590. This language also echoes that of Windsor, which shared similar concerns over the
effect on children. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694.
ss "Excluding same-sex couples from marriage thus conflicts with a central premise of the
right to marry. Without the recognition, stability and predictability marriage offers, their
children suffer the stigma of knowing their families are somehow lesser." Obergefell, 135 S.
Ct. at 2600.
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explored by the Court in this section of the opinion are nevertheless
particularly significant to this Note for two reasons.
First, the Court expressly and unambiguously acknowledges that same-
sex couples can be equally capable and loving as parents as can heterosexual
coupleS. 56 The Court's recognition of the equal capacity of same-sex parents
to provide loving and stable homes may be used as further ammunition
against discriminatory legal practices aimed at same-sex parents. Obergefell
thus stands for the principle that, in particular contexts, the negative social
effects of discrimination can be so severe that they support the recognition of
a fundamental constitutional right: the national right to same-sex marriage.
Secondly, this generalized statement against homosexual discrimination
has also contributed to an expansion of popular support for same-sex
couples. The societal impact of the Obergefell decision far exceeds the text
of the decision alone. The nationwide flood of same-sex marriages arguably
reinforced the Supreme Court's decision. Through the formation of
countless same-sex unions, a significant portion of U.S. society relied on the
Obergefell decision and therefore established a cultural precedent for same-
sex marriage.58 This "reliance interest" provides a strong argument that the
Obergefell decision will not be overruled, due to the mutual desire of the
judiciary and the general population for legal and cultural consistency.
Accordingly, this Note presumes the Obergefell precedent will not be
56 As all parties agree, many same-sex couples provide loving and nurturing
homes to their children, whether biological or adopted. . . Most States have
allowed gays and lesbians to adopt, either as individuals or couples, and
many adopted and foster children have same-sex parents. This provides
powerful confirmation from the law itself that gays and lesbians can create
loving, supportive families.
Id.
5 The Court acknowledges the Constitution is a living text and that, as such, it should
account for changes in public opinion and culture: "[R]ights come not from ancient sources
alone. They rise too, from a better informed understanding of how constitutional imperatives
define a liberty that remains urgent in our own era." Id. at 2602. This language provides
support for expansion of same-sex couples' rights in the area of parenting.
For further explanation of the "reliance interest" principal see Hillel Y. Levin, A Reliance
Approach to Precedent, 47 GA. L. REv. 1035 (2013). Levin argues that "restrictive" court
decisions (for example, Baker v. Nelson, where the Supreme Court dismissed a case
challenging a Minnesota marriage law due to lack of a federal question) provide less
persuasive arguments for precedent because those cases are "not like the sort [of cases] upon
which people organize their lives." Id. at 1071. However, the decision in Obergefell is
distinguishable: "[i]n contrast, opinions that expand protections of liberty, like a case
requiring recognition of same-sex marriage, are much less easily undone because of the
reliance-and consequent investment-they induce." Id.
5 Id.
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overturned and predicts that marriage equality will spark an expansion of
LGBT rights in the United States.
2. The Present State of U.S. Infertility Statutes
A survey of the state statutes mandating some measure of infertility
coverage shows a wide range of coverage mandates with varied available
treatment options and restrictions on access.60  Fourteen U.S. states
attempted to shift the costs of infertility and ART services by passing laws
requiring insurance companies to either mandate coverage or offer
policyholders coverage for these services.6 ' The majority of these statutes
mandate that insurers cover certain infertility treatments. All of these state
mandates are subject to some limitation, though the limitation varies.
For purposes of this Note, the fourteen existing state statutes mandating
insurance coverage have been divided into three categories: statutes with
spousal language, statutes with broad definitions of infertility, and statutes
60 See State Infertility Insurance Laws, AM. SOC. FOR REPROD. MED., https://www.asrm.org/
insurance.aspx (last visited Oct. 12, 2016).
61 The fourteen states are: Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Montana, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Rhode Island, Texas and West
Virginia. For an overview see State Infertility Insurance Laws, supra note 60. For full
statutory texts see ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-85-137 (West, Westlaw through the end of the 2016
Third Extraordinary Sess. of the 90th Ark. Gen. Assemb. & the Nov. 8, 2016 election); CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1374.55 (Deering, LEXIS through all 2016 legis. & propositions);
CAL. INS. CODE § 10119.6 (Deering, LEXIS through all 2016 legis. & propositions); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-509 (West, Westlaw through enactments of the 2016 Feb. Reg. Sess.,
the 2016 May Spec. Sess., & the 2016 Sept. Spec. Sess.); HAW. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 431:10A-
116.5, 432:1-604 (LEXIS through the 2016 Second Spec. Sess.); 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
5/356m (West, Westlaw through P.A. 99-920 of the 2016 Reg. Sess.); MD. CODE ANN. INS.
§ 15-810 (LEXIS through Jan. 1, 2017 & all chapters of the 2016 Reg. Sess. of the Md. Gen.
Assemb.); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 175, § 47H (Westlaw through Chapter 375 of the 2016 2nd
Ann. Sess.); MONT. CODE. ANN. § 33-31-102 (West, Westlaw through the 2015 sess.); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 17:48E-35.22 (West, Westlaw with laws effective through L.2016, c. 83 & J.R.
No. 11); N.Y. INS. LAW § 3221 (West, McKinney through L.2016, chapters 1-519); OHIo REv.
CODE. ANN. § 1751.01 (West, Westlaw through Files 144, 146, 147, 149, 152, 153, 157, 161
to 163, 167, 172, 174 and 175 of the 131st Gen. Assemb.); 27 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 27-41-
33, 27-19-23 (West, Westlaw through Chapter 542 of the Jan. 2016 sess.); TEX. INS. CODE
ANN. § 1366 (West, Westlaw through the end of the 2015 Reg. Sess. of the 84th Legis.); W.
VA. CODE ANN. 33-25A-2 (LEXIS through Acts of the 2016 First Extraordinary Session
2016). Louisiana's statutory scheme also addresses infertility but in a limited way that does
not pertain to this Note. See LA. STAT. ANN. § 22:1036 (Westlaw through the 2016 First
Extraordinary, Reg., & Second Extraordinary Sess. (forbidding providers to deny otherwise
covered diagnosis and treatment because they may result in infertility). New York has a
similar requirement at N.Y. INS. LAW § 3221(6)(A) (West, McKinney through L.2016,
chapters 1-519).
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without a definition of infertility. Table 1 provides a brief overview of the
state statutes that are discussed in further detail throughout this Note.
Table 1
State: Category: Key Language:
Arkansas No definition of All accident and health insurance
infertility companies doing business in this
state shall include, as a covered
expense, in vitro fertilization.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-85-137
(West, Westlaw through the end of
the 2016 Third Extraordinary Sess.
of the 90th Ark. Gen. Assemb. &
the Nov. 8, 2016 election).
California Broad definition of For purposes of this section,
infertility "infertility" means either (1) the
presence of a demonstrated
condition recognized by a licensed
physician and surgeon as a cause of
infertility, or (2) the inability to
conceive a pregnancy or to carry a
pregnancy to a live birth after a
year or more of regular sexual
relations without contraception.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 1374.55 (Deering, LEXIS through
all 2016 legis. & propositions).
Connecticut Broad definition of For purposes of this section,
infertility "infertility" means the condition of
a presumably healthy individual
who is unable to conceive or
produce conception or sustain a
successful pregnancy during a one-
year period.
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-509
(West, Westlaw through enactments
of the 2016 Feb. Reg. Sess., the
2016 May Spec. Sess. & the 2016
Sept. Spec. Sess.).
Hawaii Specific spousal (a) All individual and group
language accident and health or sickness
insurance policies which
provide pregnancy-related
benefits shall include in
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addition to any other benefits
for treating infertility, a one-
time only benefit for all
outpatient expenses arising
from in vitro fertilization
procedures performed on the
insured or the insured's
dependent spouse; provided
that:
(3) The patient's oocytes are
fertilized with the patient's
spouse's sperm;
(4) The:
(A) Patient and the
patient's spouse have a
history of infertility of at
least five years' duration;
or
(B) Infertility is associated
one of the following
medical conditions ...
[and]
(5) The patient has been unable




coverage is available under
the insurance contract ...
(b) For the purposes of this section,
the term "spouse" means a
person who is lawfully married
to the patient under the laws of
the State.
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431:10A-
116.5 (LEXIS through the 2016
Second Spec. Sess.).
Illinois Broad definition of (c) For purpose of this Section,
infertility "infertility" means the
inability to conceive after one
year of unprotected sexual
intercourse, the inability to
conceive after one year of
attempts to produce
conception, the inability to
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(2) that the patient demonstrate
infertility exclusively by





(d) (2) for a patient whose spouse
is of the opposite sex, the
patient's oocytes are
fertilized with the patient's
spouse's sperm, unless:
(i) the patient's spouse is
unable to produce and
deliver functional
sperm; and
(ii) the inability to produce
and deliver functional
sperm does not result
from:
1. a vasectomy; or




conceive after an individual is
diagnosed with a condition
affecting fertility, or the
inability to sustain a
successful pregnancy.
215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/356m
(LEXIS through the 2016 Second
Spec. Sess.).
(b) An entity subject to this section
that provides coverage for
infertility benefits other than in
vitro fertilization may not
require as a condition of that
coverage, for a patient who is
married to an individual of the
same sex:
(1) that the patient's spouse's
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(3)(i) the patient and the
patient's spouse have a
history of involuntary
infertility, which may be
demonstrated by a
history of:








2. if the patient and the
patient's spouse are
of the same sex, six
attempts of artificial
insemination over
the course of 2 years
failing to result in
pregnancy; or
(ii) the infertility is associated
with any of the following
medical conditions:
1. endometriosis;




3. blockage of, or surgical








MD. CODE ANN. INS. § 15-810
(LEXIS through Jan. 1, 2017 & all
chapters of the 2016 Reg. Sess. of
the Md. Gen. Assemb.).
Massachusetts Broad definition of For purposes of this section,
infertility "infertility" shall mean the
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condition of an individual who is
unable to conceive or produce
conception during a period of 1
year if the female is age 35 or
younger or during a period of 6
months if the female is over the age
of 35.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 175, § 47H
(Westlaw through Chapter 375 of
the 2016 2nd Ann. Sess.).
For purposes of this section,
"infertility" means the disease or
condition that results in the
abnormal function of the
reproductive system such that a
person is not able to: impregnate
another person; conceive after two
"infertility." Presently, four st the
female partner is under 35 years of
age, or one year of unprotected
intercourse if the female partner is
35 years of age or older or one of
the partners is considered
medically sterile; or carry a
pregnancy to live birth.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:48E-35.22
(West, Westlaw with laws effective
through L.2016, c. 83 & J.R. No.
11)
The determination of "infertility"
in accordance with the standards
and guidelines established and
adopted by the American College
of Obstetricians and Gynecologists
and the American Society for
Reproductive Medicine;
The determination of appropriate
medical candidates by the treating
physician in accordance with the
standards and guidelines
established and adopted by the
American College of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists and/or the
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N.Y. INs. LAW § 3221 (West,
McKinney through L.2016,
chapters 1-519).
Ohio No definition of See OHIO REV. CODE. ANN.
infertility § 1751.01 (West, Westlaw through
Files 144, 146, 147, 149, 152, 153,
157, 161 to 163, 167, 172, 174 and
175 of the 131st Gen. Assemb.).
Rhode Island Broad definition of For the purposes of this section,
infertility 'infertility' means the condition of
an otherwise presumably healthy
married individual who is unable to
conceive or sustain a pregnancy
during a period of one year.
27 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 27-41-
33 (West, Westlaw through
I Chapter 542 of the Jan. 2016 sess.).
Specific spousal
language
The coverage offered ... is only
required if:
(2) the fertilization or attempted
fertilization of the patient's
oocytes is made only with
the sperm of the patient's
spouse;
(3) the patient and the patient's
spouse have a history of
infertility of at least five
continuous years' duration or
the infertility is associated
with:
(A) endometriosis;
(B) exposure in utero to
diethylstilbestrol
(DES);
(C) blockage of or surgical
removal of one or both
fallopian tubes; or
(D) oligospermia;
(4) the patient has been unable to
attain a successful pregnancy
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coverage is available under
the group health benefit plan.
TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 1366 (West,
Westlaw through the end of the
2015 Reg. Sess. of the 84th Legis.).
West Virginia No definition of See W. VA. CODE ANN. 33-25A-2
infertility (LEXIS through Acts of the 2016
First Extraordinary Session 2016).
Three states-Maryland, Hawaii, and Texas-include specific spousal
requirements in their statutes. Maryland's language is unique because it
expressly addresses same-sex married couples. Seven states-California,
Connecticut, Illinois, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, and Rhode
Island-broadly define the term "infertility." 6 2  Four states-Arkansas,
Montana, Ohio, and West Virginia-mandate providers cover basic
enumerated services expressly including infertility but do not provide a
statutory definition of the term "infertility."
i. Statutes with Spousal Language
Of the fourteen states that mandate some measure of infertility coverage,
Maryland alone expressly addresses same-sex couples. Maryland's statute
provides a useful starting point for the analysis portion of this Note for a
number of reasons. First, Maryland provides support for this Note's general
presumption that statutory reform of infertility legislation is likely to follow
63the legalization of same-sex marriage. The state legislature's prompt
62 Instead of defining the term "infertility" in its statute, New York looks to the American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists and the American Society for Reproductive
Medicine (ASRM). See N.Y. INS. LAW § 3221 (West, McKinney through L.2016, chapters 1-
519). Nevertheless, New York fits within this category because the ASRM defines the term
"infertility" broadly as
the result of a disease (an interruption, cessation, or disorder of body
functions, systems, or organs) of the male or female reproductive tract which
prevents the conception of a child or the ability to carry a pregnancy to
delivery. The duration of unprotected intercourse with failure to conceive
should be about 12 months before an infertility evaluation is undertaken,
unless medical history, age, or physical findings dictate earlier evaluation and
treatment.
Infertility, AM. SOC. FOR REPROD. MED., https://www.asrm.org/topics/detail.aspx?id=36 (last
visited Oct. 12, 2016).
63 The Civil Marriage Protection Act of 2012 permitted same-sex marriage in Maryland and
went into effect on January 1, 2013. Maryland Approves Gay Marriage in Historic 'Question
6' Vote, HUFFINGTON PosT (Nov. 7, 2012, 12:29 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/
11/07/maryland-question-6-results-2012_n_2050830.html. Within two years, the legislature
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response to address the new state of the law following legalization of gay
marriage is comparable to the timeline that occurred in the United Kingdom.
Second, Maryland exemplifies a possible response that other states could
adopt to redraft their existing statutes to account for the same-sex marriage
decision. However, this Note will demonstrate that expressly restricting
same-sex couples access may raise problems of interpretation and
discrimination.
Pursuant to the 2016 statute, Maryland insurers must provide same-sex
couples certain fertility treatments but are not required to cover ART,
including IVF.6 4 The legislature draws on a broad interpretation of
"infertility" that expressly includes same-sex couples. The Maryland statute
may therefore be characterized as inclusive. The Act also recognizes that
same-sex couples, like heterosexual couples, can be affected by infertility
and the inability to parent biological children. Accordingly, the statute
mandates insurers cover heterosexual and same-sex couples' infertility
treatments including IVF.
Maryland's statute was amended to include language that specifically
addresses same-sex couples. The 2016 language provides:
(b) Impermissible requirements. An entity subject to this
section that provides coverage for infertility benefits other than
in vitro fertilization may not require as a condition of that
coverage, for a patient who is married to an individual of the
same sex:
(1) that the patient's spouse's sperm be used in the
covered treatments or procedures; or
(2) that the patient demonstrate infertility exclusively by
means of history of unsuccessful heterosexual
intercourse.
The 2016 text calls attention to prior coverage restrictions that were
inherently limited to heterosexuals, such as the condition that patients use
their spouse's sperm for infertility treatment and exclusionary definitions of
infertility. The 2014 version of the Maryland Act did not expressly address
infertility coverage of homosexual couples and thus was open to multiple
interpretations. The ambiguous 2014 language could be read to the
amended the state's existing infertility coverage statute to account for the change. See MD.
CODE ANN. INs. § 15-810 (LexisNexis 2015); MD. CODE ANN. INs. § 15-810 (LexisNexis
2014).
6 See MD. CODE ANN. INs. § 15-810 (LexisNexis 2016).
65 id.
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exclusion of homosexual couples or in a way that would provide equal
coverage for all couples. The amendment, by contrast, is considerably less
66
uncertain.
To qualify for coverage, the statute requires that a patient show a "history
of involuntary infertility." Heterosexual married couples may provide
evidence of "intercourse of at least 2 years failing to result in pregnancy,"
while same-sex married couples meet this requirement through "six-attempts
of artificial insemination over the course of 2 years failing to result in
pregnancy."68 Alternately, a married couple of any sexual orientation may
demonstrate infertility associated with enumerated medical conditions
including endometriosis, DES, and oligospermia. 6 9  Thus, there remain
distinct differences between Maryland's access requirements for
heterosexual and same-sex married couples.
The 2016 Maryland statute initially appears to be inclusive and
expansive, but in practice it may present more of a barrier to homosexual
access than its predecessor.70 On the one hand, the legislature expressly
disapproves of certain inherently discriminatory interpretations of infertility.
On the other hand, however, the amended language means undiagnosed
same-sex married couples must bear the cost of six attempts of artificial
insemination to demonstrate the necessary history of infertility to qualify for
covered IVF. These substantial cost differences between couples seeking
66 Courts often interpret textual changes to an act to be intentional and thus significant. See,
e.g., Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 182 (1978) (exemplifying a case in which the
Court's majority opinion relied heavily on legislative context and history in parsing the





70 For a legislative amendment to be enacted into law, a proposed bill must pass through
both houses. This process theoretically subjects the law to critical analysis by numerous and
politically diverse legislators. As a result, U.S. courts have established several interpretative
presumptions. These include assumption that the legislature carefully chose the text,
accounted for its practical application, and understood how the act would interact with
preexisting laws on the subject. Despite the fact that many of these presumptions rely largely
on legal fictions, the underlying idea that the legislature acts rationally and with foresight
remains important. See, e.g., United States v. Costello, 666 F.3d 1040, 1044 (7th Cir. 2012)
("One can properly attribute to legislators the reasonable minimum intention to say what one
would ordinarily be understood as saying, given the circumstances in which it is said.");
Sekhar v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2720, 2724 (2013) ("Where Congress borrows terms of
art . . . it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each
borrowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken and the meaning its use will
convey to the judicial mind unless otherwise instructed." (quoting Morissette v. United States,
342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952))).
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infertility coverage based on sexual orientation have given rise to
discrimination challenges.n
Like Maryland, Hawaii and Texas also condition coverage of fertility
treatments upon marriage.72 However, both of these states' statutory
requirements rely on heterosexual conceptions of marriage that cannot be
reconciled with the new definition of "spouse" following the legalization of
same-sex marriage. The Texas statute provides:
The coverage offered under Section 1366.003 is only required
if:
(2) the fertilization or attempted fertilization of the
patient's oocytes is made only with the sperm of the
patient's spouse;
(3) the patient and the patient's spouse have a history of
infertility of at least five continuous years' duration or
the infertility is associated with:
(A) endometriosis;
(B) exposure in utero to diethylstilbestrol (DES);
(C) blockage of or surgical removal of one or
both fallopian tubes; or
(D) oligospermia;
(4) the patient has been unable to attain a successful
pregnancy through any less costly applicable infertility
treatments for which coverage is available under the
group health benefit plan.73
Texas implements a variety of restrictions in their statutes. These range from
obvious limitations, such as the requirement that a patient must be a member
71 Kimberly Leonard, Who Has the Right to Build a Family?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.
(Aug. 15, 2016, 12:01 AM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2016-08-15/same-sex-infe
rtility-case-exposes-lack-of-access-to-reproductive-treatment (discussing a lawsuit brought by
two lesbian couples against the New Jersey insurance commissioner, arguing for equal access
to infertility treatments).
72 The language used in these statutes is almost identical to that of Maryland's 2014
statutory requirements. Cf MD. CODE ANN. INS. § 15-810 (LexisNexis 2014).
73 TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 1366.005 (West, Westlaw through the end of the 2015 Reg. Sess.
of the 84th Legis.). Hawaii's statute features very similar language but defines the term
"spouse" as "a person who is lawfully married to the patient under the laws of the State."
HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431:10A-116.5 (LEXIS through the 2016 Second Spec. Sess.).
Homosexual married couples fall squarely within the statutory meaning of the term "spouse"
because Hawaii legalized same-sex marriage in 2013. See Hawaii Governor Signs Bill
Legalizing Gay Marriage, DAILY NEwS (Nov. 13, 2013), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/
politics/hawaii-govemor-signs-bill-legalizing-gay-marriage-hawaii-article- 1.1515772.
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of the health plan, to medically specific qualifications such as requiring a
couple to demonstrate a history of infertility.74 Many of these restrictions
equally affect same-sex and heterosexual couples. 75 However, the condition
that "the fertilization or attempted fertilization of the patient's oocytes is
made only with the sperm of the patient's spouse" proves problematic. 6
This provision highlights a tension between the text and the post-Obergefell
state of affairs. The statute assumes that married couples seeking infertility
treatment are composed of one male and one female. However, the
undefined term "spouse" should be interpreted to reflect Obergefell and
incorporate same-sex married couples.
Absent a statutory definition, courts engage in statutory interpretation to
parse a term's meaning. Generally, the first step looks to the plain meaning
of the term.77 Often courts seek to interpret the term in the manner in which
it was understood when the law was passed. 78 However, here Obergefell
expanded the legal meaning of the term "spouse" as a matter of federal law.
Thus, the Supreme Court's interpretation controls in every state.79  The
contemporary dictionary and ordinary meaning should reflect this change
accordingly.8o Therefore, a court would interpret the term "spouse" to mean
74 See Ins. § 1366.005 (Westlaw); § 431:10A-116.5 (LEXIS).
7 These provisions ask that "the patient and the patient's spouse have a history of infertility
of at least five continuous years," and "the patient has been unable to attain a successful
pregnancy through any less costly applicable infertility treatments." Ins. § 1366.005
(Westlaw).
76 Ins. § 1366.005 (Westlaw). Hawaii similarly requires that "the patient's oocytes are
fertilized with the spouse's sperm." § 431:10A-1 16.5 (LEXIS).
" See, e.g., United States v. Gayle, 342 F.3d 89, 92 (2d Cir. 2003) ("Statutory construction
begins with the plain text and, if that text is unambiguous, it usually ends there as well.");
United States v. Costello, 666 F.3d 1040, 1043 (7th Cir. 2012) ("[Ilt is true that the words
used, even in their literal sense, are the primary, and ordinarily the most reliable, source of
interpreting the meaning of any writing: be it a statute, a contract, or anything else.").
78 See, e.g., Univ. of Tex. Southwestern Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2529 (2013)
(finding a reading of a statutory text that was inconsistent with the "design and structure of the
statute as a whole" to be problematic and against the rule of statutory interpretation that "[j]ust
as Congress' choice of words is presumed to be deliberate, so too are its structural choices").
7 The distinction that Hawaii passed state legislation legalizing same-sex marriage prior to
Obergefell, but Texas did not proves inconsequential to the interpretation of the term
"spouse." Hawaii's statutory definition of spouse as "a person who is lawfully married to the
patient under the laws of the State" raises comparable inconsistencies. § 431:1 OA- 116.5
(LEXIS). In addition, the majority in Obergefell pointed out, "[i]t is of no moment whether
advocates of same-sex marriage now enjoy or lack momentum in the democratic process"
when the issue is one of a constitutionally protected right. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2606.
so The argument that the ordinary meaning of the term "spouse" includes same-sex couples
is supported by evidence of reliance interest. Contemporary dictionary definitions further
support such a reading. Merriam-Webster defines the term "spouse" to mean "someone who
is married"; this definition is neutral and may be applied equally to heterosexual or
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legally recognized married couples including both heterosexual and same-
sex couples.
Requiring that fertilization "only" occur by use of the spouse's sperm
effectively excludes same-sex couples from the statute's class of eligible
spouses, which in turn excludes same-sex couples from obtaining similar
insurance coverage for in vitro fertilization. The inconsistency between the
post-Obergefell meaning of the term "spouse" and the statute's presumption
that all married couples are heterosexual exhibits an implicit contradiction
that leaves the fate of infertile same-sex couples in limbo.
The spousal conditions on coverage are defined by the statutory
enumerated restrictions that are not based on financial concerns of the
provider or particularized medical conditions of the patient. Rather, the
requirement that in vitro fertilization must use the spouse's sperm
unambiguously excludes all married couples of the same sex. It is often true
that healthcare requires that a line be drawn somewhere, if only for financial
reasons. However, drawing the line in a way that unambiguously excludes
all same-sex married couples from medical treatments that are provided for
similarly situated heterosexual couples discriminates on the basis of sexual
orientation.
The three state statutes discussed above apply Obergefell in the most
direct and obvious way because of their express treatment of marriage and
spouses as a means of restricting coverage for enumerated infertility
treatments. These states-Hawaii, Maryland, and Texas-demonstrate the
myriad ways that existing statutory schemes relying on spousal language are
difficult to reconcile with Obergefell. In addition, this section's analysis
highlights the complexities of drafting coherent and comprehensive statutes
that establish necessary limits on coverage for infertility treatment but that do
not discriminate against same-sex married couples.
ii. Statutes with Broad Definitions ofInfertility
Seven states-California, Connecticut, Illinois, Massachusetts, New
Jersey, New York, and Rhode Island-broadly mandate that third-party
insurers provide diagnosis of and treatment for infertility." Unlike Hawaii,
homosexual married couples. Spouse, MERRIAM-WEBSTER (Nov. 23, 2015), http://www.mer
riam-webster.com/dictionary/spouse.
81 See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1374.55 (Deering, LEXIS through all 2016 legis. &
propositions); CAL. INS. CODE § 10119.6 (Deering, LEXIS through all 2016 legis. &
propositions); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-509 (West, Westlaw through enactments of the
2016 Feb. Reg. Sess., the 2016 May Spec. Sess., & the 2016 Sept. Spec. Sess.); ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/356m (West, Westlaw through P.A. 99-920 of the 2016 Reg. Sess.); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 175, § 47H (Westlaw through Chapter 375 of the 2016 2nd Ann. Sess.); N.J. Stat.
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Maryland, and Texas, these seven states do not limit insurance coverage by
reference to express marriage or spousal language. This may lead some to
argue that Obergefell need not be applied to them. Yet analyzing these
statutes in light of Obergefell is nevertheless valuable because it shows the
range of existing state statutory schemes and their treatment of same-sex
married couples.
California, Connecticut, Illinois, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York,
and Rhode Island's infertility statutes may all be read in a way that is
inclusive for same-sex couples. For example, Massachusetts's "Coverage for
Medically Necessary Expenses of Diagnosis and Treatment of Infertility"
statute provides in pertinent part, "[flor purposes of this section, 'infertility'
shall mean the condition of an individual who is unable to conceive or
produce conception during a period of 1 year if the female is age 35 or
younger or during a period of 6 months if the female is over the age of 35.",82
A literal reading of the Massachusetts definition may reasonably include
homosexual couples.8 3 Homosexual individuals and couples will not
"conceive or produce conception" during a one-year period (or any period)
Ann. § 17:48E-35.22 (West, Westlaw with laws effective through L.2016, c. 83 & JR. No.
11); N.Y. INS. LAW § 3221 (West, McKinney through L.2016, chapters 1-519); 27 R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. § 27-41-33 (West, Westlaw through Chapter 542 of the Jan. 2016 sess.).
82 Ch. 175, § 47H (LEXIS). Cf HEALTH & SAFETY § 1374.55 (LEXIS) ("For purposes of
this section, 'infertility' means either (1) the presence of a demonstrated condition recognized
by a licensed physician and surgeon as a cause of infertility, or (2) the inability to conceive a
pregnancy or to carry a pregnancy to a live birth after a year or more of regular sexual
relations without contraception."); § 38a-509 (West) ("For purposes of this section,
'infertility' means the condition of a presumably healthy individual who is unable to conceive
or produce conception or sustain a successful pregnancy during a one-year period."); ch. 215
§ 5/356m (LEXIS) (For purpose of this Section, 'infertility' means the inability to conceive
after one year of unprotected sexual intercourse, the inability to conceive after one year of
attempts to produce conception, the inability to conceive after an individual is diagnosed with
a condition affecting fertility, or the inability to sustain a successful pregnancy."); INs.
§ 17:48E-35.22 (Westlaw) ("For purposes of this section, 'infertility' means the disease or
condition that results in the abnormal function of the reproductive system such that a person is
not able to: impregnate another person; conceive after two years of unprotected intercourse if
the female partner is under 35 years of age, or one year of unprotected intercourse if the
female partner is 35 years of age or older or one of the partners is considered medically sterile;
or carry a pregnancy to live birth."); INs. § 3221 (McKinney) ("The determination of
'infertility' in accordance with the standards and guidelines established and adopted by the
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists and the American Society for
Reproductive Medicine."); and ch. 27 § 27-41-33 (Westlaw) ("For the purposes of this
section, 'infertility' means the condition of an otherwise presumably healthy married
individual who is unable to conceive or sustain a pregnancy during a period of one year.").
83 Courts interpret terms consistent with the statutory definition even if it differs from the
ordinary meaning or dictionary definition. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 942 (2000)
("When a statute includes an explicit definition, we must follow that definition, even if it
varies from that term's ordinary meaning.").
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without assisted reproductive measures. The California statute's qualification
requirements for couples seeking ART are more specific than
Massachusetts.84 Yet, the California statute still lends itself to a possible
inclusive reading, that a homosexual couple engaging in unprotected sex for
the specified period of time will be unable to conceive, and therefore, under a
strict literal application of the text, may qualify for coverage of fertility
treatment.
Though theoretically plausible, this same-sex friendly interpretation likely
would not stand in a court of law. It is a general rule of statutory
interpretation that the plain meaning of statutory text is king, but it is also
true that a statute cannot be read in a manner fundamentally at odds with its
original intent and purpose.8 ' Here the legislature clearly did not intend for
the statutory definition of 'infertility' to apply to same-sex couples.
The language and context logically lends itself to an alternative
interpretation. Conditioning infertility coverage on the couple's inability to
conceive implicitly requires that the couple in question engage in sexual
intercourse between two members of the opposite sex. California's use of
the telling phrase "regular sexual relations without contraception" indicates
that the intercourse should be reasonably calculated to result in conception.86
Otherwise, the express requirement that the couple forgo contraception
would serve no purpose. This would create a possible violation of the
statutory rule of construction against reading laws in a way that renders
language superfluous.
If a court were to read the text literally to include same-sex couples, a
provision that was clearly intended to serve as a limitation on coverage
would result in the opposite effect. Reading the provision to include same-
sex couples would, in effect, offer unlimited infertility treatment coverage to
all same-sex couples in the plan because all same-sex couples engaging in
sexual intercourse would not conceive during the specified period.
Comparatively, only those heterosexual couples that demonstrate the
requisite history of infertility during the specified time period would be
afforded equal fertility coverage. Contrary to the clear legislative intent,
8 Compare HEALTH & SAFETY § 1374.55 (LEXIS), with LAWS ch. 175 § 47H (LEXIS).
8 See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. U.S., 461 U.S 574, 586 (1983) ("It is a well established
canon of statutory construction that a court should go beyond the literal language of a statute
if reliance on that language would defeat the plain purpose of the statute.").
86 HEALTH & SAFETY § 1374.55 (LEXIS).
8 See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 522 (1996) (stating the "well-settled rule of
statutory construction" that "courts should disfavor interpretations of statutes
that render language superfluous").
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such an expansive reading of the term "infertility" would serve little to no
restrictive function.
A close reading of the statutes in California, Connecticut, Illinois,
Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, and Rhode Island reveal that all of
these statutes employ heterosexually exclusive methods of determining the
requisite history of infertility. The use of such broad definitions of the term
"infertility" raises possible discrimination problems comparable to statutes
that used spousal language. If the broad, intercourse-based definitions of
infertility were redrafted so that they only applied to heterosexual persons,
the statute would need to provide a comparable test for homosexual
individuals to show the requisite history of infertility. As shown by the
Maryland example, requiring homosexual individuals to demonstrate a
history of infertility via artificial insemination could have the unintended
effect of imposing disproportionally higher costs. Alternately, the statutory
language could be redrafted to require that same-sex couples show a
diagnosis of infertility including for example, endometriosis, DES, or
oliospermia. However, one of the reasons the medical community adopted
the alternate results-based tests for infertility was precisely because diagnosis
through traditional medical tests was difficult. Such a plan would
unambiguously exclude infertile homosexual individuals that did not fit
within the limited forms of diagnosable infertility while providing
heterosexual individuals other means of demonstrating the requisite
infertility.
iii. Statutes Without a Definition ofInfertility
The integration of the Obergefell decision is least problematic when
applied to existing state statutes that do not define the term "infertility."
Presently, four states-Arkansas, Montana, Ohio, and West Virginia-
require all insurers to provide a minimum level of coverage for certain basic
enumerated health services including infertility. For example, the Montana
statute simply provides that "infertility" falls within the meaning of "basic
healthcare services."8 Montana's statutory text does not express further
88 Compare MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-31-102 (West, Westlaw through the 2015 sess.), with
ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-85-137 (West, Westlaw through the end of the 2016 Third
Extraordinary Sess. of the 90th Ark. Gen. Assemb. & the Nov. 8, 2016 election), OHio REV.
CODE ANN. § 1752.01(West, Westlaw through Files 144, 146-47, 149, 152-53, 157, 161-63,
167, 172, 174-75 of the 131st Gen. Assemb.), and W. VA. CODE ANN. 33-25A-2 (LEXIS
through Acts of the 2016 First Extraordinary Session 2016).
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qualifying restrictions on who may or may not receive coverage, nor does it
limit which treatment options for infertility should be made available.89
On their face, these statutes appear neutral and largely unaffected by
Obergefell. However, if we view Obergefell and its subsequent effect on
other state insurance mandates as a catalyst for legal and social change, even
seemingly neutral statutory schemes like those of Arkansas, Montana, Ohio,
and West Virginia may be impacted.
It will be necessary for third-party insurers to interpret the term
"infertility" to define the scope of their policies. The simple act of defining
the term "infertility" restricts access to infertility treatments, including ART.
Thus, insurers in these states face similar problems of interpretation as their
counterparts in states governed by statutes that define infertility through
spousal language or a history of infertility demonstrable through intercourse
that does not result in conception.
It is in the best financial interest of insurance companies to interpret
infertility narrowly. The more treatments an insurance company covers, the
more money it must pay out to healthcare providers such as hospitals. The
financial implications, however, do not stop simply with the insurance
companies. With increased insurance coverage can come higher premiums
for policyholders. Thus, insurance companies need to strike a careful
balance.
Defining the term too narrowly could also exclude classes of persons that
have historically been extended ART coverage. For example, one means by
which states could limit the class of persons eligible for ART coverage
would be to restrict access to treatment to only those persons who can be
diagnosed with infertility by way of conditions such as endometriosis, DES,
or oliospermia. From a statutory interpretation perspective, the neutral
language would not raise obvious problems of discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation. However, as discussed earlier, such an approach would
likely be too restrictive as infertility is inherently difficult to diagnose. In
addition, this policy may result in the exclusion of women who have waited
to have children because of lifestyle choices. Though there is evidence that
female infertility declines with age, large numbers of women wait until their
thirties or even their forties before conceiving for a variety of personal
reasons, including financial considerations and career initiatives. It has been
a longstanding practice for many U.S. states and insurance companies to
extend ART and fertility coverage to women under these circumstances,
though insurers will often impose an age limit. For example, the Connecticut
89 The Arkansas statute, by contrast, mandates that providers include in vitro fertilization as
a covered expense. See § 23-85-137 (Westlaw).
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statute allows insurers to limit coverage to policyholders under forty, and the
Rhode Island law allows a limit at forty-two. 90 An interpretation that
excludes all couples without a diagnosable medical condition identified with
infertility may thus be unpopular with many U.S. women.
3. The U.S. Government and ART
The U.S. government has historically played only a limited role in the
area of medical insurance. This is largely due to federalism concerns and the
constitutional divisions between state and federal areas of regulation.
Traditionally, healthcare has been reserved to the individual states under
their Tenth Amendment police power.91
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (Affordable Care Act)
marked a decisive shift in the federal government's historically hands-off
approach to regulation of the national private insurance market.92 President
Barack Obama signed this seismic piece of legislation into law on March 23,
2010, despite vehement political, public, and legal opposition.93 Through the
Affordable Care Act, the federal government took an unprecedented
regulatory role in the private health insurance market.9 4 One of the Act's key
objectives was to expand medical insurance on a national scale. 5 The
resulting restructuring of the U.S. healthcare system impacted not only
9 See CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-509 (West, Westlaw through enactments of the 2016
Feb. Reg. Sess., the 2016 May Spec. Sess., & the 2016 Sept. Spec. Sess.); 27 R.I. GEN. LAWS
ANN. § 27-41-33 (West, Westlaw through Chapter 542 of the Jan. 2016 Sess.).
91 Historically, states have been the primary regulators of the insurance industry. The 1945
McCarran-Ferguson Act provided that, in the context of antitrust law, health insurance falls
within the meaning of "interstate commerce" and therefore is subject to federal regulation in
areas where the states have not asserted their primary regulatory power. See McCarran-
Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1945).
92 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18001 (2010).
93 See Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (upholding a
constitutional challenge of the Affordable Care Act's individual mandate). For an example of
the continuing public healthcare debate, see Robert Pear, Many Say High Deductibles Make
Their Health Law Insurance All But Useless, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2015), http://www.nytime
s.com/2015/11/15/us/politics/many-say-high-deductibles-make-their-health-law-insurance-all-
but-useless.html?r=0.
94 For a summary of the primary initiatives of the Affordable Care Act, see Assistant
Secretary for Public Affairs, About the Law, HHS, http://www.hhs.gov/healthcare/about-the-
law/index.html# (last visited Aug. 13, 2015).
9 The Affordable Care Act had other objectives, including cost shifting. This spurred one
of the Act's most controversial provisions, the individual mandate, which required all
Americans to purchase a minimum coverage insurance plan or pay a fee. The Supreme Court
upheld this provision as a valid exercise of the federal government's enumerated power of tax
and spending in a sharply divided 5-4 opinion. See Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius,
132 S. Ct. 2566, 2574 (2012).
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public government programs such as Medicaid but also the private insurance
market."
The Affordable Care Act requires that all health insurance companies
provide coverage for the Act's expansive list of "essential health benefits."
Infertility was not included. Accordingly, the Affordable Care Act reserved
the choice to mandate infertility coverage to the states. Third-party insurers'
obligation to extend coverage for infertility turns on whether a state
considers infertility coverage to be an "essential health benefit." 9 7 However,
recently proposed Health and Human Services (HHS) legislation suggests
that the federal government no longer wishes to leave the regulation to
individual state discretion.
HHS recently proposed a new rule for the anti-discrimination clause of
the Affordable Care Act, Section 1557, which proposes that discrimination
on the basis of sex include discrimination based on gender identity." The
rule seeks to address discrimination against transgender persons. However,
it also clarifies that HHS "support[s] banning discrimination in health
programs and activities ... on the basis of sexual orientation."99 HHS
acknowledges that current law is "mixed" on whether Title IX discrimination
"on the basis of sex" prohibits sexual orientation discrimination but
highlights a recent EEOC decision reaching this conclusion.100 Thus, HHS
takes a strong and expansive position against health program discrimination
on the basis of sex, including on the basis of sexual orientation and
potentially gender identity.
HHS's proposed rule expresses concerns similar to those espoused by the
majority in Obergefell. Both advance the idea that discriminatory treatment
on the basis of sexual orientation violates certain fundamental and profound
American principles of equal treatment. HHS parallels Obergefell's novel
discussion of a penumbral constitutional right that is implied by the
intersection of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses.10 Both the HHS rule and Obergefell are evidence of the
96 Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, supra note 94.
97 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18001 (2010); Katie Falloon
& Philip M. Rosoff, Who Pays? Mandated Insurance Coverage for Assisted Reproductive
Technology, 16 JAMA ETHICS 63-69 (2014).
98 For the full text of the proposed rule, see Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and
Activities, 80 Fed. Reg., 54,174 (Sept. 8, 2015) (defining the term "gender identity" as "an
individual's internal sense of gender, which may be different from an individual's sex
assigned at birth").
9 Id. at 54,176.
10o Id.
101 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602-03 (2015).
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social and legal trend against discriminatory treatment of the LGBT
community, including same-sex couples.
In addition, the proposed legislation provides support for this Note's
proposition that, following Obergefell, the legal protections of the LGBT
community will expand rather than contract or remain stagnant. Further, the
rule advances this Note's argument that the U.S. expansion will be
comparable to the U.K. precedent, where reform of the healthcare industry
promptly followed recognition of same-sex marriage. Finally, the proposed
HHS rule indicates that state legislators and health care facilities will be held
to increasingly strict standards against discrimination.102
The HHS initiative and the larger legal trend it represents raise serious
questions over whether states and healthcare insurers may provide disparate
coverage of infertility services for heterosexual couples and same-sex
couples. As the HHS proposal acknowledges, the law is inconclusive on
whether discrimination on the basis of sex includes sexual orientation
discrimination. Thus, it remains unclear whether limiting insurance coverage
for infertility treatments and ART to same-sex couples constitutes Title IX
discrimination. However, the HHS proposed rule provides further incentive
for states and healthcare insurers with ambiguous and potentially
discriminatory infertility coverage requirements to redraft their requirements
in a manner that does not arbitrarily discriminate on the basis of sexual
orientation.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Note demonstrates that the fourteen existing state health insurance
mandates for infertility treatment and ART are largely unworkable in post-
Obergefell America. Even the clearest application of Obergefell to statutes
with spousal restrictions requires complicated statutory interpretation.
Similarly, statutes that broadly define infertility or do not define infertility at
all each raise difficult questions of where state legislators should draw the
line. This Note's attempt to reconcile existing statutory language, much of
which relied on presumptions of heterosexuality, with Obergefell ultimately
results in convoluted and inconsistent statutory schemes. Accordingly, states
should redraft their infertility legislation, and health insurance companies
should reinterpret the scope of infertility coverage.
This Note also highlights recent developments in the social and legal
realms, which lay the groundwork for more expansive protections of
homosexual individuals and same-sex couples. Obergefell discusses the
102 Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 80 Fed. Reg. at 54, 176.
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possibility of a combination right against discrimination arising from the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. HHS
similarly expresses support for an interpretation of Title IX's notion of
discrimination on the basis of sex which extends to sexual orientation
discrimination as well. These examples suggest that increasing popular
support for the LGBT community may initiate heightened legal protections
against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.
This Note predicts that the Obergefell decision will initiate an expansion
of homosexual couples' access to infertility treatments and the growing area
of ART in the United States. The ambiguities in the existing statutory
scheme and increasing social and legal support for homosexual rights call for
anti-discrimination protections. State legislation and health insurance
policies that exclude same-sex couples from infertility and ART coverage
will be neither socially acceptable nor legally solid.
Therefore, states should extend substantially the same infertility and ART
treatment options to homosexuals as they presently do for heterosexual
individuals and couples. States may continue to restrict access in ways that
do not depend on a policyholder's sexual orientation. Many existing statutes
already impose limitations such as limits on age or number of treatment
cycles per policyholder. Increased coverage requirements naturally give rise
to cost considerations because increased coverage mandates directly affect
the prices of insurance premiums for the public. However, the U.K. provides
a compelling example of both an inclusive and an expansive coverage system
that extends to a wide range of social groups. The U.K. provides restrictions
similar to those seen in existing U.S. statutes, such as limiting the number of
treatment cycles available to a particular couple and offering preference to
childless couples or individuals, would allow for equal access by all classes
of persons, including married couples and single women of all sexual
identities, while managing runaway costs. A similar scheme could strike the
necessary financial balance because evidence suggests that while ART is
expensive for individuals, ART does not account for a large portion of
national healthcare expenditures. 103  This Note's approach effectively
protects against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, while
remaining financially viable.
103 Chambers, Sullivan, Ishihara, Chapman & Adamson, supra note 14 (explaining that this
is evidenced by the fact that the average cost of one IVF cycle in 2009 accounted for 15/o-
18% of individuals' annual disposable income in the U.K. and 44/o-50% in the United States;
yet, nationally ART accounted for less than 0.25% of total healthcare expenditures in all
countries, with the U.S. national outlay on ART services revealed to be the lowest percentage
of total healthcare expenditure of all the countries surveyed, at just 0.06%).
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